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operation of many firms at a site, creates a first-mover disadvantage that can prevent relocation.
It is demonstrated that developers of industrial parks can partly overcome this inertia through
discriminatory pricing of land over time, and empirical evidence is provided that they actually
engage in such behavior. It is also shown that other aspects of developer land-sale strategy can
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The tendency of different firms within an industry to cluster together has been
noted at least since Marshall [1961 (1890)1,forwhom this tendency was a powerful
testament to the existence of economies of agglomeration. Because these agglomerated
industries sometimes form the nuclei of cities it is convenient to refer to them as
"city—industries".' Contemporary economists interested in understanding the economics of
city-industries have brought them under the heading of economic behavior that displays
strategic complementarities: an agent is better off when other agents choose the same
action that he does, rather than being worse off due to increased competition. Models of
this type of behavior, admirably surveyed by Krugman [1991a], typically display multiple
equilibria. This property is alleged in the recent work of Arthur [1990] and Krugman
[1991b] to extend to city—industries, where the equilibria are locations in different regions
of the same country or in different countries entirely. This same work attempts to
demonstrate that "history" plays a large role in determining which equilibrium is actually
chosen as the outcome.
In Arthur's model, firms enter the industry in sequence. Each firm chooses a
location on the basis of how many firms are there at the time of entry and a random vector
that gives the firm's tastes for each possible location. If agglomeration economies are
unbounded as the number of firms increases, then as the industry grows large one location
takes all but a finite set of firms with probability one. Which location is chosen depends on
the locational preferences of the early entrants and thus on historical accident. In
Krugman's model, history determines an initial distribution of workers between two
locations, which in turn determines the initial difference in wage rates between these two
locations. Although Krugman's workers are endowed with perfect foresight unlike Arthur's
purely myopic firms, given his assumption of a cost of changing locations that is convex in
II have borrowed this term from Glaeser et ad. [1992].2
the aggregate rate of movement, his workers all wind up (for certain ranges of parameter
values) in the location with the higher initial wage, just as though they were responding to
the current wage only.
The importance of the result that "history matters" in choosing which equilibrium
is the outcome is that there is no assurance that history will choose the most efficient
outcome. A region that "should" have a comparative advantage in the city-industry
because the opportunity cost of its labor is low or its resource endowments are well suited
for the industry's production may be denied the industry by historical accident. By taking
this logic perhaps farther than its authors intended it to go, we could conclude that certain
regions or countries may be condemned to agricultural poverty, not because of lack of
human and physical resources or because of poor governmental management, but simply
because of bad luck.
On the other hand, much of world economic history since World War Two concerns
the shift of agglomerated industries from high-cost to low-cost locations, suggesting that in
the city—industry case inefficient "equilibria" may not deserve the name. In response to
lower wages and the invention of air-conditioning, the United States has witnessed a
massive shift of its manufacturing industry from the old cities of the Northeast and
Midwest to the so-called Sunbelt, swelling medium-sized Southern and Western cities
based on distribution and service into major manufacturing metropolises. In many
branches of manufacturing the dominant location of supply to the world market has
changed more than once. For example, during the lISOs Taiwan replaced Europe and
Japan as the world's major exporter of bicycles, and in the early 1990s China has emerged
as the second leading exporter and may conceivably displace Taiwan by the end of the
decade [Mody et al., 1991]. Bateman and Mody [1991] document the rise of a "bicycle
city" in the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen. They also describe the formation of other
agglomerated export-oriented industries in the coastal provinces of Fujian and Cuangdoog,
including shoes and garments. The key common element in these examples of shifts of3
agglomerated industries around the globe and the shift of agglomerated industries within
the United States is the attraction of lower costs, especially lower labor costs, rather than
the attraction of new markets: manufacturing industry in the United States did not move
to the Sunbelt primarily to serve the Sunbelt market. The attraction of low wages for the
formation of new city-industries is demonstrated more generally by the econometric study
of Glaeser et al. [1992], who find that employment growth between 1956 and 1987 in
city-industries other than the four that were the largest in the city in 1956 depends
negatively on the city's 1956 wage outside those four industries.
The questionable sustainability of inefficient city-industry locational equilibria will
come as no surprise to an urban economist familiar with the "system of cities" model of
Henderson [1985]. Henderson argues that the existence of a more efficient site at which the
city-industry can locate creates a profit opportunity for entrepreneurs whom he calls
"developers". A developer can finance purchase of the land at the more efficient site by
selling shares in a "land bank company" to agents who move there, pay these agents a level
of dividends competitive with that of the communities from which they move, and still
retain a profit. It is implicitly assumed that by guaranteeing a competitive level of
dividends the developer can avoid a coordination failure that would leave every agent at
the inefficient site with the expectation that if he were to move, no one else would follow
and his share in the land bank company would be worthless.2 The Henderson argument
effectively denies any role to history in determining city-industry location except when the
locations are economically identical. Thus history matters for the choice of city-industry
location only when it does not "matter" at all.
Henderson's model of developer behavior is highly stylized. I contend that a great
2As Dybvig and Spatt [1983] point out in a more general framework, government
guarantees would solve this problem. Indeed, public-private partnerships are common in
the area of industrial park development discussed below. In this paper, however, I focus on
private developers because they operate on a strictly for-profit basis, the only ambiguous
case being Tampa Industrial Park (cited in Section III below) which was developed by the
Committee of 100 of the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce.4
deal about the economics of agglomeration and the degree of importance of history in
determining the location of city-industries can be learned by looking at the behavior of
teal—world developers, and in particular at the behavior of developers of "industrial parks"
(also called industrial estates or industrial districts) who are explicitly attempting to
capitalize on firm complementarities. The scale of these parks can be sufficient to support
a medium-sized city. For example, about 25,000 workers are employed at Irvine Spectrum,
an industrial park in Orange County, California, which is itself a successor to the Irvine
Business Complex previously developed by the Irvine Company where about 105,000
workers are employed. An extended quotation from a recent article on the city of Irvine
[Siegle, 1992] illustrates the power of an industrial park to facilitate agglomeration:
The massive, 2,600-acre master—planned business center was built with the
goal of creating a center that would attract companies interested in
high-tech and international trade. The plan worked. With approximately
1,000 tenants, Irvine Spectrum houses 177 high-tech and biomedical firms,
25 Fortune 500 companies and serves as the American regional headquarters
of 21 Pacific Rim companies. Robert Hovee, president of Life Support
Products and an Irvine Spectrum tenant, believes that the building of such
an infrastructure created a kind of "self—fulfilling prophecy" and is one of the
factors explaining why Irvine has emerged as an axis for international and
high—tech businesses. "This area is now the center for biomedical
engineering in the United States," Hovee notes. "And as a result, people
doing business in the medical arena are going to have to come here sooner or
later." (p. 14)
The plan of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II a model of how
the weight of history might sustain an inefficient equilibrium is formulated and the essence
of developer strategy to overcome history is shown to be discriminatory pricing of land over
time. The next section presents empirical evidence concerning the validity of this model.
Section IV addresses more subtle elements of developer land-sale strategy and shows that
they can shed some light on the nature of interfirm externalities, and Section V concludes.5
11. Reexamining the Role of History in City-industry Location
It is useful to begin with a model that I believe distills the essential elements from
the papers cited above on multiple equilibria for city-irulustry location and the role of
history in determining the choice of equilibrium, and from earlier work on the same topics
in the literature on interregional and international trade [e.g., Helpman and Krugman,
1985, Chapter 4]. The assumptions of the model are as follows:
Assumption 1. There exist two regions, which may or may not be part of the same
country.
Following the trade literature I call these the "home" and "foreign" regions, marking
variables associated with the latter by an asterisk. Each region contains one potential site
for the city—industry, the location of which could be determined by the existence of
particularly favorable transportation possibilities.
Assumption 2. There exist N (an integer) identical "footloose" firms in the city—industry.
In light of the discussion of industrial parks above it is important that I model firms as the
decision-makers regarding location.
Assumption 3. Each firm earns profit s(n) in the home region and ir*(n*) in the foreign
region, where r and rt are monotonicafly increasing and n + nt =N.
Here I am following Arthur [1990] in specifying economies of agglomeration as a function of
the number of firms in the region. We could think of these profit functions as generated by
identical, price-taking entrepreneurs who maximize the rents (profits) to the time they
supply inelasticafly to a production process that displays constant returns to scale at the
firm level.
Assumption 4. ir"(x) >ir(x)for 0 ￿ x N.
This reflects lower costs in the foreign region. These lower costs might be due to lower
wages, which in turn could be caused by lower foreign productivity in nonfootloose industry6
I
suchas agriculture.
Assumption 5. There exists n > 1, not necessarily an integer, such that r(N -n*)=
Ifthis assumption did not hold every firm would trivially choose to locate in the foreign
region.
We can model the N firms as playing a game in which there are two pure strategies,
locate at the home site and locate at the foreign site. It is clear that there exist only two
Nash equilibria in pure strategies: all firms locate at the home site and all firms locate at
the foreign site) It follows from Assumption 4 that the latter equilibrium is more
efficient. The preferred method of choice between these equilibria in the trade literature
[see, e.g., Panagariya, 1986] is the Marshallian adjustment process, which works as follows.
History gives us an initial distribution of firms N-nt, n6 between the home and foreign
sites. Firms then move towards the site that offers the higher profit, i.e., towards the
home site if n < n and towards the foreign site if n > n*. The process is
self-reinforcing, and thus history (na) uniquely determines which equilibrium obtains
provided that n n*. Intuitively, behind the Marshallian adjustment process is an
adaptive expectations story in which each firm's expectations concerning what strategy
other firms will play are based on what strategies they have played in the past. If other
firms are expected to play the same strategy in the future as they did in the past then it
makes sense for any firm taking other firms' strategies as given to follow the Marshalilan
3Suppose there existed a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where fit firms play locate
at the foreign site and N -ñtfirms play locate at the home site. Equilibrium requires that
?(nt)￿ir(N—fit+1) and ir(N—flt) ￿ t(nt+i) These requirements contradict the
assumption that ?(x) is monotonically increasing. There does exist, however, a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium. In such an equilibrium firms must be even worse off (on an ex
ante basis) than they are in the pure strategy equilibrium where they all locate at the home
site. The reason is that each firm must be indifferent between playing the mixed strategy
--and choosing the home site with probability one, yet the expected payoff from the latter
strategy is strictly lower than it would be if all firms chose the home site with probability
one.7
adjustment rule.4
In this paper it is my contention that history does influence which city-industry
locational equilibrium obtains, but that at least in the post-World War Two period the
channel for that influence is usually not the one in the Marshallian analysis (or in the
related analyses cited in Section I). In the Marshallian analysis history is assumed to give
us an initial distribution of firms between two competing sites. In post-World War Two
reality, however, the situation is typically that all firms are located at an old, established
site, and some change occurs that makes a new, lower wage site much more attractive than
it was when the old site was established--perhaps a technological change such as invention
of air-conditioning or a political change such as a policy of welcoming rather than
discouraging foreign investment or establishment of a free-trade zone. The advantage
conferred on the old site by history is then not that it influences expectations about what
firms will do, because the information communicated by these past choices is now
irrelevant. Rather, the old site has an advantage over the new one because the operation of
many firms there inevitably results in some sunk cost that would have to be incurred anew
should firms move to a different site. Because the benefits of these sunk costs do not
completely vanish when firms relocate, the productivity of a site may be as strongly
influenced by the number of firms that have ever been there as by the number of firms that
are there now.
For the remainder of this paper I will take this position, and thus the influence of
history, to an extreme and assume that the productivity of a site depends only on the
number of firms that have been there in the past. A plausible story for why this might be
4The Marshaflian adjustment process would not pass muster as an "equilibrium
refinement's in game theorists' parlance. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Crawford [1991,
section 3], in the two—strategy case the Marshallian dynamics lead to the same outcomes as
the "evofutionary" dynamics that are gaining popularity among game theorists as an
equilibrium selection mechanism. Crawford offers an adaptive interpretation of
evolutionary dynamics similar to the adaptive expectations rationale for the Marshallian
dynamics that I give here.8
the case builds upon one of the standard reasons given for agglomeration economies: firms
are able to observe and learn from what other firms do without paying in full for the
benefit of this information.5 In particular I suppose that the information that spills over is
generated by learning-by-doing about how to operate most efficiently at a given site: how
best to adapt to the climate, labor force, transportatioo opportunities, local government
regulations, and so on.5 If each entrepreneur-firm reveals one idea as a result of starting
up production, then the profit functions ir and ? will depend on the total number of firms
that were present at the site by the end of the preceding period or the largest number that
has ever been there, whichever is greater. This formulation implicitly assumes that
knowledge about how to operate most efficiently at a given site does not depreciate.
Formally, we can replace Assumption 3 above with
Assumption 3'. Each firm earns profit r[ max(ni)] in the home region and
-I<1 ￿t-1
max (n)] in the foreign region, where t denotes the current period.
-T<1 ￿t-1
There are two practical consequences of this "as if' model of externalities. First,
productivity at the old site does not decline if firms leave it. Second, productivity at the
new site will depend on the number of firms lagged one period. As we shall see, this model
will help us understand both the difficulties history creates for relocation of city-industries
and the behavior of developers attempting to overcome those difficulties.
Let us now reexamine the game being played by our N entrepreneur-firms. I relabel
the home and foreign sites the "old" and "new" sites, respectively, and label location at the
old site "staying" and location at the new site "moving". These new labels reflect the
5Bateman and Mody [19911 term this process, which they observed in the Special
Economic Zones in Fujian and Guangdong provinces in China, "watching and talking".
Evidence of total factor productivity benefits from the average level of education in U. S.
cities, and thus implicitly for the importance of information spillovers, is given in Rauch
[1993a]. More direct evidence for the localization of knowledge spillovers within cities is
provided by patent citations, according to Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson [1993].
This is similar to Bardhan's (1971] model of spillovers within an infant industry that is
trying to adapt best-practice foreign technology to local conditions.9
assumption, based on the previous discussion, that all firms are initially located at the old
site. Suppose all firms were to decide to move. In the first period, each firm would lose
,r*(Q) -ir(N)as a result of moving, since by assumption zero firms have ever been at the
new site and N firms have ever been at the old site before the first period. In all
subsequent periods each firm would gain (N) -ir(N).Assume that the discounted sum of
gains outweighs the loss. Given this behavior on the part of all other firms, any individual
firm has the option to stay the first period and avoid the loss r*(O) -ir(N),receive the gain
r(N-l) -ir(N)in the second period, and receive the gain r4(N) -(N)in all subsequent
periods. I call this behavior "wait and see", since the firm waits and sees what all the
other firms have learned, and then moves. If the firm's own contribution to learning is
small relative to the total contribution of all firms, wait and see does better than moving.
But then no firm will move!
After adding one assumption we can formalize the preceding discussion in a
Proposition:
Assumption 6. There exists a positive world interest rate of i per period and an iafinite
time horizon.
Proposition 1. No firm moves in any Symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if
(i) E,r(O)— r(N)]/(l+i)+ [r*(l) —r(N)]/i(1+i)< 0, and
(ii) [,r*(0) —r(N)J/(l-i-i)+ [(N) —,r*(N_1)]/(1+i)20.
In stating conditions (i) and (ii) I establish the convention of discounting all payoffs back
to period zero that I will maintain for the remainder of this paper. Condition (1) insures
that it does not pay for a firm to move (locate at the new site) if no other firm does.
Condition (ii) insures that wait and see does better than moving when firms play
symmetric pure strategies.
Under conditions (i) and (ii) every firm prefers to let all other firms move from the
old to the new site first. However, it seems possible that if we introduce some asymmetry
among firms in their desire and ability to move, it might be possible for one or more first10
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movers to arise that other firms could follow in some equilibrium order. An extreme form
of such asymmetry is in Farrell and Saloner [1985, section 2]:
Assumption 7. Firm jhasthe opportunity to move only in period j.
This fixed sequence of moving opportunities is artificial, yet it is implicit in many models
in which agents "arrive" at a decision node in some fixed sequence [e.g., Arthur, 1990,
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992]. In the present context a fixed sequence of
moving opportunities could arise, for example, because firms' plants are subject to
"one—hoss shay" style depreciation, i.e., 100 percent depreciation in one period, with
exactly one firm having its plant wiped out in each period.
Suppose that all firms were to move in the fixed order specified by Assumption 7.
We can write the payoff to firm j discounted back to time zero as
(1) P =E._[ir*(t_1)
—lr(N)]/(1+i)t+ [r(N) —r(N)]/i(l+i)N.
It is useful to define fl by ,r*(fi*) =r(N)so that v*(t_1) —ir(N)> 0 for t > ñ*+1. We
can now prove a modification of the corollary to Proposition 1 in Farrell and Saloner [1985,
p. 73]:
Proposition 2. If P1 > 0, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for all firms to
move.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that if P1 is positive then 2''N are all
positive because as the index j increases only nonpositive terms are deleted from P until
> fi+1, at which point P becomes a sum of positive terms only. It follows that P1 > 0
ensures that, for each firm j, if firms 1 through j-1 have already moved it will also choose
move over stay, provided it believes all the remaining firms will follow. Since firm j knows
this is true for firms j+1 through N it knows they will move if it does; so it moves.
Note the implicit increase in information requirement involved in this proof: it is assumed
that each firm has some knowledge of the payoffs of all other firms (or at least all others
that follow it). The stronger assumption that firms' payoffs are common knowledge will be
maintained throughout the rest of the paper.11
We see that once the first firm moves, all other firms "jump on the bandwagon" and
the city-industry relocates to the new site. However, we can also prove:
Proposition 3. If P1 <0,then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for all firms to
stay.
Proof of Proposition .IfP1 <0,then firm 1 chooses stay over move. But then
the payoff to firm 2 from moving if all subsequent firms move, discounted back to period 1,
is strictly smaller than P1, so firm 2 also chooses stay over move, and so on.
Thus if firm 1 does not start the bandwagon rolling, neither will any subsequent firm.
From these two Propositions it follows that to evaluate the conditions under which
the city-industry will relocate from the high-wage to the low-wage site we need only
evaluate the conditions under which P1 >0.P1 is more likely to be positive:
(a) the greater is ir*(x) relative to 'r(x);
(b) the lower is the interest rate, since this increases the later, positive terms relative to
the early, negative terms;
(c) the less there is to learn (the less important is agglomeration), i.e., the greater is lr*(O)
relative to r"(N);
(d) the "faster" is learning (the greater the share of learning done by the first firms), where
displays faster learning thanif [1(j)- ?1(0)]/[ir(N)-r*'(0)]>
[r*2(j)-?2(0))/[ir"2(N)
—?2(O)1Vj =1,...,N—1,with at least one strict inequality. An
increase in the number of firms N, keeping the amount there is to learn constant, can be
treated as equivalent to slower learning.
Note that as the interest rate goes to zero any advantage of the new site over the old
(?(N) > r(N)) is sufficient to cause the city-industry to relocate and we have the
Henderson model where history does not matter.
Proposition 3 shows that the city-industry will not relocate to the more efficient
site spontaneously if the first firm with an opportunity to move does not find it profitable
to do so. By the same token, if only the first firm (or first few firms) does not find it12
profitable to move if all other firms follow, a large profit could be made if one could induce
this firm to move and then capture the payoffs of the following firms. I now argue that it
is natural for the institution of the industrial park to develop in order to serve as a vehicle
for realizing this profit opportunity. This argument requires me to add a potential role for
land to my model. I therefore add the following three assumptions:
Assumption 8. Each firm inelastically demands land on which to build its plant, the cost
of which must be subtracted from its profits. Without loss of generality I set the
amount of land demanded by each firm equal to one unit.
Assumption 9. Each site contains more than N units of land suitable for use by the
city-industry.
Assumption 10.Landis supplied competitively.
Since it follows from Assumptions 8-10 that the price of land is zero, in themselves these
assumptions do not affect the validity of either Propositions 1-3 or the preceding
Marshailian analysis of choice of equilibrium.
Suppose that an entrepreneur, whom I will call a developer, could acquire all of the
land suitable for use by the industry in question at the new site. His optimal plan is then
to practice perfect price discrimination over time,7 i.e., he should establish a schedule of
land prices equal (in present discounted value) to the schedule of payoffs p8 How can the
TKatz and Shapiro [1986, section IV.B.] study the optimal pricing plan for the
monopoly supplier of a new technology subject to network externalities that is competing
with an old technology priced at marginal cost. The externalities are a function of the
contemporaneous number of agents that purchase the new technology. There are two
periods in each of which a generation of consumers decides which technology to buy. The
optimal plan can involve pricing below marginal cost to the first generation of consumers,
just as the developer may want to subsidize the first firm in the present model.
8Could firms undercut this price schedule through resale? It is easily shown that any
firm will be indifferent at any point in time between reselling its land and returning to the
old site and continuing operations at the new site. This indifference is eliminated in favor
of staying at the new site if the seller extracts anything less than the full payoff to moving
from the buyer. In any case, the developer can always prevent resale by signing long-term
leases with the firms instead of giving them title to the land. Lee and Wong [1958, p. 24]
state, "Some developers write restrictions into the lease or sales agreement and require
occupants to build on purchased or leased property within a given period of time (usually
one year). If the time limit is not observed, the developer customarily has the option of13
developer obtain this local land monopoly? One method is for the developer to buy all the
land suitable for use by the industry, but this will drive its price above zero and perhaps
eat up all of his potential profits. A preferred method is for the developer to buy N units of
land at price zero, and then negotiate with local government to zone only his land for use
by the industry in question. If bargaining is efficient, the local government will agree to
this zoning policy because it maximizes the surplus that it can divide with the developer.
Since the local government cannot extract more than the total surplus from the developer,
the details of this bargain need not concern us here because they do not affect the
developer's profit-maximizing pricing schedule nor what is called below the "viability" of
the industrial park. In practice this bargain mainly concerns the level of public amenities
provided by the developer and his share of the cost of providing infrastructural services.'
The result of this process is an industrial park or district consisting of N units of
land." The total profit realized by the developer of the industrial park from his perfect
price discrimination strategy is
(2)'1PJ = 1t[,r*(t_1)-r(N)]/(1+i)t+ N[ir*(N) -lr(N)]/i(l+i)N.
We can now state the following Proposition:
buying back the property at the original price."
9The Urban Land Institute [1988, p. 181 states that, "special zoning districts,
established for a single business park or for a combination of developments, have become
increasingly common. In return for the right to develop certain amounts of different land
uses, a developer agrees to provide designated public improvements and adhere to speciflc
standards of development that are designed to be in the public interest." Efficiency of
bargaining can be facilitated by "capture" of the local government by the developer, which
is especially likely when the developer has a hand in establishing the local government.
This was the case with the Irvine industrial parks mentioned in Section I, with the Boca
Baton industrial park cited in Section III below and with the 10,500 acre Bayport
petrochemical park in Clear Lake, Texas [described in ULI, 1975].
"According to ULI [1988, pp. 13—17], the first planned industrial estate was begun in
1896 in Manchester, England, when a private company purchased a 1,200-acre country
estate on the Manchester Ship Channel adjoining the docks. In the United States, the
railroads were the most important developers of industrial districts in the pre-World War
Two era, beginning with the Original East District in Chicago in 1902 and continuing
through thelandmark Central Manufacturing District begun in Los Angeles in 1922.14
I'
Proposition4. If expression (2) is positive, a developer practicing perfect land price
discrimination over time can successfully engineer the relocation of the
city-industry from the old to the new site. We then say that the industrial park is
"viable".
Clearly this condition for viability is much weaker than the condition P1 > 0 that obtained
in the absence of a developer, although the same four factors that make satisfaction of the
latter condition more likely also make satisfaction of the former condition more likely. In
terms of the question with which this paper began, the developer reduces the extent to
which history can outweigh efficiency in determining city-industry location, although
unlike in the Henderson model history can still matter if ?(N) -r(N)> 0.
Remarks on monopoly power. In a more general model there could be more than
one new site capable of competing with the old site for the city-industry. The developer of
the most attractive new site would have to lower his schedule of land prices sufficiently to
prevent entry by the second most attractive new site. This competition will lower his total
profit but, like the bargain with the local government, it cannot affect the viability of the
industrial park. More worrisome for the utility of Proposition 4 is the fact that, if we
consider a U. S. metropolitan area to be a "site", it is now common to observe more than
one large-scale industrial park with vacant land for sale at a given site in the United
States. This is not surprising in light of the existence of many jurisdictions within a given
metropolitan area, each with its own zoning powers. Often the parks are targeted at
different industries and so are not in competition with each other. Direct competition
typically results from sequential entry in response to greater than expected demand, a
situation beyond the scope of this paper. How much this situation, in contrast with the
ideal represented by the Irvine Company's Orange County operations cited in Section I,
affects the ability of the developers to price discriminate depends on many factors,
including the extent to which the externalities generated by an industrial park travel
"across town", the degree to which the developers can differentiate their products through15
their offerings of services and amenities, and the nature of their oligopolistic interaction.
Whether the simple model of price discrimination presented here captures the important
features of the data is the subject of the next section.
ifi. Empirical Evidence
An extensive search of the literature reveals that industrial parks have received no
attention from academic economists, but have been studied by economists outside of
academia and by the development industry itself. The economists' studies are
concentrated in the 1950s, evidently in response to the post-World War Two boom in
industrial park development in the United States. This boom is of some interest in itself.
Lee and Wong [1958] note that only 4.2 percent of "organized industrial districts" edsting
in the United States in 1957 were established before 1940. While accelerated diffusion of
this institutional innovation might have been expected in any case given post-World War
Two prosperity, the analysis of this paper suggests that the reduction in transport costs
(especially due to construction of the interstate highway system) was also an important
factor because it freed manufacturers from the need to locate next to their major markets
and thus created greater possibilities for developers to attract them to new locations. Some
further evidence on this point is provided below.
I found four sources that contained price data and/or analysis of pricing strategy for
industrial parks: the aforementioned study of Lee and Wong [1958, sponsored by the
Stanford Research Institute], two studies by the Urban Land Institute [Boley, 1962 and
TJLI, 1988, the latter an update of a 1975 study], and a trade journal article by Carestlo
[1971]. I first address the claim made in Section II that developers get involved in
attracting an industry to a new location because the first firm (or few firms) to move loses
money by doing so and thus requires a subsidy that the developer can provide. In the 1988
Urban Land Institute (ULI) monograph, entitled Business and Industrial Park Development
Handbook, a team of writers that included several developers summarized the findings from16
their survey of experience of leading industrial developers in the United States and their
professional associates, from case studies, and from a review of the trade journal literature.
Of particular interest for this paper is their description (pp. 168-169) of the typical
land—sale strategy for the developer of a "large—scale, long-term business park". In the
first stage of development land is sold to one or more "seed tenants" who will "set the
reputation and character of the project and of the tenant mix." According to the principal
author of the study [Beyard, 1992], these seed tenants are "loss leaders", and if the same
terms were offered to all subsequent tenants the developer would "go bankrupt".
Quantitative evidence is provided by Lee and Wong (pp. 10 and 16), who find for the
developers they surveyed that the cost of acquisition and improvement of land averaged
22.6 cents per square foot and that the initial sales price of lots averaged 18.6 cents per
square foot.11
The predictions of the model of Section II concerning the time path of land prices in
industrial parks cannot be matched as precisely to the available information. Observed
prices are current values, rather than values discounted back to the period before the
industrial park was established, and reflect factors such as inflation and economic growth
that are not present in the model. Nevertheless, the available inlormation is very
suggestive and worth reporting:
(a) Like Lee and Wong, Carestio [1971] performed an independent survey of industrial
parks, which he used as the basis for a purely cross-sectional regression analysis of the
determinants of land price per square foot. He found that the effect of the age of the
industrial park was positive and significant.'2 Carestio hypothesizes (p. 18) that, "As time
passes, additional portions of the park are absorbed [occupied] so that economies of
"Acquisition and improvement averaged only 59.3 percent of total costs. It will be
shown in Section IV below that promotion costs can help explain another aspect of
developer land-sale strategy.
'2Note that a naive "vintage" approach would suggest the opposite relationship.
Carestio presumably does not use actual occupancy as his independent variable in order to
avoid simultaneity bias.17
agglomeration are reflected in increased value." He also found a negative and significant
effect of distance to the nearest limited access highway interchange and no effect of
distance to the central business district of the metropolitan area, providing more evidence
consistent with the view that firms move to industrial parks to find an attractive location
from which to "export" their output rather than to find a location dose to an attractive
market.
(b) Lee and Wong do not report actual time paths of prices, but do make two summary
statements:
Land prices in industrial districts increase sharply after the first year to
perhaps double the original price. (p. 1)
Analysis of changing land values indicates a pattern of low original prices
followed by a sharp increase during the first year or two. Thereafter, prices
increase but at a slower rate say many developers. (p. 17)
This pattern of price increases suggests the intuitively plausible interpretation that the
economies of agglomeration realized within the park are concave in the number of firms,
although it can be shown that concavity of ?(x) is not necessary for the percentage
increase in the prices defined by equation (1) in Section II to decrease as the number of
firms increases.
(c) Boley [1962] and ULI [1988] each contain two case studies of large-scale industrial
parks in which land sale price is reported for more than one time period. Boley [1962, pp.
77 and 91] reports for Brook Hollow Industrial District in Dallas, begun in 1954, that the
first two sites sold for $0.10 per square foot and that lots were selling for $1.00 per square
foot at the time of writing (1962); and for Tampa Industrial Park, begun in 1956, that the
initial land parcel sold for $1,000 per acre, the next two parcels for $2,000 per acre, and
that recent sales were in the $5,000—$10,000 per acre range. ULI [1988, pp. 175 and 252]
reports for Arvida Park of Commerce in Boca Raton, Florida, that the sales price per acre
increased from its initial value of $40,000 in the "late 1970s" to $350,000 at the time of
writing (1987); and for Park 10 in Houston, Texas that prices rose from $0.75 per square18
foot in 1974 to a range of $9 to $18persquare foot in 1987.' The most straightforward
interpretation of the spectacular land price increases in these case studies appears to be the
one suggested by the model of Section II: later tenants are paying for the privilege of
benefitting from economies of agglomeration as firms accumulate within the park, allowing
the developers to recoup the costs they incurred in subsidizing early tenants.
Alternative explanations. There exist alternatives to the view presented in this
paper that developers internalize agglomeration economies within industrial parks. One
alternative is that developers simply bet on exogenous increases in the popularity of the
areas in which they invest as sites for industrial location. If this view is correct the
increases in land prices within industrial parks described above merely reflect increases in
the price of land in the surrounding areas (though even then it is conceivable that the
causality runs in the reverse direction), possibly combined with elimination of the subsidies
provided to the seed tenant(s). It is possible to check this alternative explanation directly
for the four case studies given by Boley [19623 and IJLI [1988] above. Table I compares the
increase in the value of land in these four industrial parks to the increase in the average
value per acre of agricultural land and buildings in the counties in which they are located. 14
Supposewe infer from the information supplied by Lee and Wong that the first doubling of
land prices within the industrial parks is due to the elimination of the subsidy provided to
the first tenants. Even in this case, the maximum proportion of the remaining price
increases that can be accounted for by increases in the value of the surrounding land is 48
'5Houston has no zoning code, but the developer of Park 10 was nevertheless able to
obtaln monopoly power by purchasing a strip of land along Interstate 10 that was bounded
on the north and south by large, unbuildable flood control areas (later turned into Cullen
Park) and on the east by existing development, leaving cheap farmland to the west that
was developed for moderately priced employee housing.
'4Values for the years 1956 and 1962 were interpolated using average annual growth
rates between 1954 and 1959 and between 1959 and 1964, respectively. Since buildings
should only account for a small fraction of the value per acre the increase in this value
should be a good measure of the increase in land prices in the surrounding area. The Brook
Hollow Industrial District and Park 10 were in fact built on agricultural land, while Tampa
Industrial Park was built on an old military base and the source of the land for the Arvida
Park of Commerce was not given.percent for Tampa Industrial Park.
Table I
Multiples By Which Land Prices Increased, Industrial Parks Vs. Surrounding Areas
pjQ4 industrial park surrounding area
19781g87 Arvida Park of Commerce 8.8 Palm Beach County 1.9
1954-1962Brook Hollow Industrial District 10.0 Dallas County 2.1
1978—1987Park 10 1806 Harris County 1.9
1956-1962Tampa Industrial Park 751 Hillsborongh County 1.8
Sources.Boley(1962), ULI (1988), U. S. Census of Agriculture (various years).
alnitial land price for Arvida Park of Commerce reported for late 1970s'.
6Based on midpoint of land price range given by Boley or VU.
It would be unwise to reject this alternative explanation only on the basis of a
nonrandom sample of four industrial parks, and clearly more evidence needs to be gathered.
In its absence I offer the following argument. The subsidization of early tenants by
developers of industrial parks is not in dispute. Developers who wish to bet on exogenous
increases in the popularity of the areas in which they invest have available to them the
option of pure land speculation. This option must dominate industrial park development
since it does not require the investor to incur any losses on seed tenants, hence industrial
park development as observed would not take place if this alternative explanation were
correct.
A more sophisticated alternative explanation would explain the practice of
subsidizing seed tenants. In this view developers compensate early tenants for uncertainty
concerning whether the industrial park will deliver the requisite services (e.g.,
infrastructure and amenities). Satisfactory operation of these early tenants resolves this
uncertainty for later tenants who are therefore willing to pay more for land in the park.20
Note that this uncertainty does not concern whether the industrial park will be fully
occupied, since by assumption the tenants receive no benefits from location of other firms
within the park (no agglomeration economies are being internalired) and are therefore
indifferent concerning its occupancy level per se. Nor should this uncertainty concern
whether the new site is in fact a lower cost location than the old (holding constant the
quality of the development), since presumably the developer cannot know more about this
than a firm in the industry in question and thus cannot credibly signal any knowledge in
this area.
A test of this alternative explanation might be possible in principle. Some
specialized firms have developed many industrial parks in the post-World War Two period,
and should have acquired a reputation that would allow them to reduce or eliminate their
subsidies to early tenants if the alternative explanation is correct. At present there edsts
no evidence regarding any relationship between number of prior industrial parks developed
and the seed tenant subsidy offered by the developer of a new industrial park. However,
one might expect such experienced development firms to come to dominate the market so
that seed tenant subsidies would become a less important feature of industrial park
development over time, yet there is no indication of this in the trade literature (e.g.,
compare the discussion of seed tenants in Boley [1962], ULI [1975], and ULI [1988]).
Again I offer an argument in the absence of adequate empirical evidence.
Developers of industrial parks must charge later tenants land prices that exceed land
acquisition and improvement costs (not to mention promotional costs) in order to recoup
their losses on sales to earlier tenants. Despite this added expense to the majority of
tenants, in the United States in the post-World War Two period the institution of the
industrial park was able to displace (but not eliminate) the previous practice whereby
manufacturing firms developed their own sites individually. The success of this new
institution is difficult to understand if it merely served to raise costs for most tenants by
making them pay for the resolution of uncertainty they could have avoided if they21
developed their own sites. Indeed, under this alternative explanation industrial parks
would inhibit rather than promote development of new, lower cost locations by inserting an
unproductive "middleman" into the development process.
IV. Time-phasing of Land Sales and Sequencing of Heterogeneous Firms
In this section I offer tentative explanations for some intriguing but less robust and
less well-documented phenomena concerning the land-sale strategies of industrial park
developers. Interpreted in the context of my model, these phenomena can shed light on the
nature of interfirm externalities. Subsection A addresses time-phasing of land sales and
Subsection B addresses preferences regarding sequencing over types of firms. Clearly none
of these phenomena can be explained in the framework of Section II where one of N
identical firms moves each period in a fixed sequence, so we return to the (implicit)
assumption that applied before the introduction of Assumption 7:
Assumption 7'. Firms can move in any period.
We must now confront a problem that occurs when a developer tries to induce more
than one firm to move in the same period while practicing perfect price discrimination. To
illustrate, suppose the developer chooses to defeat the wait and see strategy and induce all
firms to move simultaneously in the first period by setting a land price schedule such that
the price in the second and all subsequent periods is sufficiently high to deter any firm from
waiting. The problem is that this plan restores the edstence of an equilibrium where all
firms stay at the old site, since each firm is willing to pay the price to move charged by the
developer only on the assumption that all other firms also move. One way to avoid this
problem is to suppose that rather than selling the land the developer charges a current
value rent in every period t equal to ir*(n i -(N).This yields the same present
discounted value to the developer but from the firm's point of view does not depend on the
actions of any other firm. One could also simply assume that the developer sells the land22
and is able to use his leadership position to coordinate firms on the efficient equilibrium. 15
Because of the prevalence of land sales and long-term leases in real-world industrial parks,
I will use the word "sale" rather than "rent" to refer to land transactions.15
A. Phasing
Sometimes developers do not offer all of the land available after the seed tenants
have made their purchase/lease agreements for sale immediately. Instead the development
is "phased" with the expectation that increases in the price of land in the later phases will
more than make up for the cost of waiting.'7 Why should a developer have a seed tenant or
a phasing policy when he can sell all of his land in the first period?
Intuitively, there are two reasons to suspect that selling all his land in the first
period may not be the best the developer can do. First, if learning is especially rapid for
the first few firms, it may make sense to sell only a few units of land in the first period
because the higher price that firms in the second period will be willing to pay will more
than make up for the cost of waiting to receive their payments. This is the intuitive case
for selling first to seed tenants. Second, if later firms contribute little to learning, it may
make sense to hold some units of land off the market until the second period because the
higher price one can charge these firms will more than make up for the slightly lower price
one can charge to the firms that come in the first period. This is the intuitive case for the
'A formal analysis of how the developer accomplishes this might view the developer
as engaged in "pre-play communication" with firms through his promotional activities for
the industrial park. For an example of how (leaderless) pre-play communication can
increase the likelihood of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, see Farrell [1987].
iSThis prevalence probably results in part from the fact that in the presence of
substantial moving costs a firm that agrees to a renewable short-term rental arrangement
is vulnerable to rent hikes by the developer that would make it worse off than if it had
stayed at the old site.
liRichard Cannon, Vice President in charge of the Irvine Company's
Commercial/Industrial Division, states, "Proper phasing of a product can mean absolute
dollars in your pocket today. For example, we had a 75-acre, small-lot industrial
subdivision, in which each lot was approximately three-quarters of an acre. The project
was divided into three phases. In the first phase, the average price per square foot was $1.
Eighteen months later, the last phase was concluded at an average price of $6 a square
foot" [National Association of Industrial and Office Parks, 1983, p. 14[.23
developer to sell his land in phases. Both of these arguments depend implicitly on the
concavity of ,r*(x), and thus it seems possible that in the model of this section it will be
optimal for the developer to follow both seed tenant and phasing policies, selling a few
units of land in the first period and stretching the sale of the remaining units over two or
more additional periods.
Given the number of units of land he makes available in each period, the developer
again manimizes his profits if he can sell the land in each period at a price equal to the
purchasers' expected payoffs. Firms facing this price schedule will be indifferent as to the
period in which they move, so a notional excess demand or supply could occur in the land
market in some period(s). I assume that if there is excess demand the developer can
costlessly ration land so that the rationed firms that make their purchases in a later period
are as well off as the firms that were not rationed. Now suppose that notional excess
supply occurs. If the developer responds by lowering that period's price by an arbitrarily
small amount, all firms now desire to move in that period: no firm chooses to wait because
all know that only the planned number of firms will be able to obtain land that period and
thus the payoff to moving in future periods will still not exceed the scheduled prices. If
notional demand equals supply, no firm would want to withdraw its offer and wait since its
own contribution to learning has already been incorporated into the price to be charged for
land next period.
The developer's total profit can now be expressed by the following more general
version of (2) above:
(3) in[,r*(nti)
—,r(N)I/(l+i)t,
wheren is the number of firms in the industrial park at time t. The difference between
expressions (2) and (3) is that in the former nt =tfor 0 t ￿ N and n =Nfor N < t <
If expression (3) is positive when evaluated at the developer's optimal sales plan we again
say that the industrial park is viable. In Rauch (1993b) numerical simulations are used to
find these optimal sales plans for a given set of model parameters and three different24
concave functional forms for lr"(nt_i). In all three cases the developer chooses to provide
large subsidies to a small number of firms ("seed tenants") before selling off the rest of his
land, and in two cases the remaining land is sold in two "phases".
These results show that, even when an assumption is changed to allow firms to
move in any period, for certain parameter values the model can still explain developer
subsidization of the first firms or "seed tenants" and subsequent steep escalation of land
prices. It should also be noted that the role of the developer in overcoming history when
firms can move in any period involves the defeat of a wait-and-see strategy in addition to
the subsidization of pioneer firms. Finally, industrial park developers' occasional use of
phasing can be interpreted as evidence that (at least some of) interfirm externalities are
reallzed with a lag and that their effects on profits are concave in the number of firms.
B. Heterogeneous firms
Iargued in the preceding subsection that if the developer has the choice to sell all
(or even most) of his land in the first period it is likely that he will not sell the manimum
number of units if the profit function ?(x) is strictly concave. It follows that among the
set of firms able to move in the first period, some will move sooner and some later. Since
in the real world firms are heterogeneous rather than identical, it is then natural to ask
whether the model of this section (appropriately extended) predicts that the developer will
choose to sell land to certain types of firms sooner and certain other types later. I consider
two kinds of heterogeneity here: heterogeneity in size and heterogeneity in profit per unit
of contribution to learning.
Size heterogeneity. Suppose that size heterogeneity occurs through equal
proportionate variation in all relevant firm characteristics, so that when we say one firm is
twice as large as another we mean that the values of the profit function, land requirement,
and contribution to learning of the larger firm are all double those of the smaller firm. In
this case, except for potential problems of indivisibility, there is no reasdh for the developer
to distinguish between firms of different sizes when deciding to which firms he will sell land25
first.
In the real world it appears that developers typically seek out large firms as seed
tenants. Lee and Wong [1958, P. 17] state that it is the policy of developers "to induce
nationally prominent firms to become the first tenants" and the continuation of this
practice today is confirmed by industry sources [Beyard, 1992]. This policy is easy to
understand once one takes account of the fact that promotion is an important part of
developers' total costs.' Clearly if one wishes to inform firms of the existence and features
of a new industrial park (e.g., using direct mail and a follow-up phone or in-person
contact), it is cheaper to reach one large firm than two equivalent small firms. It follows
that, although the total current value of these promotional costs for the city-industry is
fixed, the present value is minimized by advertising to large firms first. Moreover, if the
large firm(s) is "nationally prominent" its location in the new industrial park will provide
"free advertising" that is more productive, the more firms remain to be attracted to the
park. Of course the present value of promotional costs must be deducted from the
developer's total profit, making the condition for viability of the industrial park somewhat
more difficult to satisfy.
Heterogeneity in profit per unit of contribution to learning. Industrial zoning policy
in the United States in the post-World War Two period has become more flexible, allowing
developers to add office, commercial, and even residential land uses to the traditional
manufacturing and warehousing land uses in industrial parks. Developers of these
"business parks" typically reserve the "most valuable" land in the park (which usually
means the land most accessible by automobile) for these nontraditional, "higher value"
-
uses,waiting until the park is otherwise built out by traditional uses before selling these
parcels [ULI, 1988]. Some of these nontraditional uses clearly do not fit into my modeling
'8Lee and Wong [1958, p. 20] find for the developers they surveyed that "an
aggressive promotional program" for an industrial park accounted for 14 to 28 percent of
total costs.26
framework because their outputs are nontradeable: hotels and retail centers are good
examples of such nonfootloose uses. Office uses, on the other hand, typically include
corporate headquarters that produce services that are interregionally and internationally
traded.'° Can we use the model of this section to make sense of the fact that developers
typically sell land for office use after selling off the land they have designated for
manufacturing use?
One possibility is to think of the N firms as differing in profit per contribution to
learning. It is obvious that if the developer is going to choose not to sell all his land in the
first period, he would prefer to sell to firms with more profit per externality contribution
later, so as to maximize the contribution of early sales to later payoffs and minimize the
subsidy component of the early land prices. These firms may also have higher profit per
unit land and thus represent "higher value uses", though this is not necessarily the case.
The typical behavior of developers of business parks thus makes sense in the context of the
model of this section if we think of office uses as having a higher profit per unit of
contribution to learning than manufacturing uses. Expressed differently, the model of this
section tells us that we can infer from developer behavior that manufacturing produces
localized externalities for headquarters services but that the converse effect is weaker. This
supports the view of some economists and political scientists that "manufacturing matters"
[Cohen and Zysman, 1987], though one would not want to push this point very far without
further investigation.
Developers speak of selling the land they have reserved for nontraditional uses after
their business parks have "matured" [McCormick, 1992]. In the limit the contribution to
learning of these firms is zero, in which case one would not want to sell land to these firms
until the period after nt has equaled or exceeded ñt to avoid including any subsidy
component in the land price. It thus seems natural to define a park as "mature" in period
'9For a model of international trade in corporate headquarters services see Helpman
[1984].27
if nt_i ￿ fl*. One can then imagine recasting the analysis of city-industry relocation in
this paper into a model of the establishment of a tradeable "base" activity for a new city.
Once the base "matures", nontradeable activities grow, and the ultimate size of the city is
limited only by congestion diseconomies.
V. Conclusions
This paper has argued that in the post-World War Two period history affects
city-industry location by creating a first-mover disadvantage that can prevent relocation
from an old, high-cost site to a new, low-cost site. It has demonstrated that developers of
industrial parks can partly overcome this inertia through discriminatory pricing of land
over time, and has provided empirical evidence that they do in fact engage in such
behavior. Finally, the paper has shown how other aspects of developer land-sale strategy
can be a source of information on the nature of interfirm externalities. Empirical work in
this area is urgently needed.
A major theme of recent growth theory is that growth at the national level is driven
by investments in knowledge and other capital by forward-looking firms. This paper shows
that growth (or shrinkage) at the local level can be driven in part by these same firms'
responses to incentives offered by forward-looking developers, who are themselves making
investments in land. Just as recent papers on growth at the national level show how
national government policy can affect the growth rate, this paper shows how local growth
can be influenced by local government policy. Zoning policy in particular was singled out
for a fresh look, with an eye to its role in conferring monopoly power on devriopers that
permits them to practice price discrimination.28
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